Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
AMCIS 2004 Proceedings

Americas Conference on Information Systems
(AMCIS)

December 2004

Designing Information Systems Security Policy in
Higher Education
Jon Saltzman
Claremont Graduate University

Abhijit Gadkari
Claremont Graduate University

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2004
Recommended Citation
Saltzman, Jon and Gadkari, Abhijit, "Designing Information Systems Security Policy in Higher Education" (2004). AMCIS 2004
Proceedings. 555.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2004/555

This material is brought to you by the Americas Conference on Information Systems (AMCIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in AMCIS 2004 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

Saltzman, et al.

Designing Information Systems Security Policy in Higher Education

Designing Information Systems Security Policy
in Higher Education
Jon Saltzman
School of Information Science
Claremont Graduate University
jon.saltzman@cgu.edu

Abhijit Gadkari
School of Information Science
Claremont Graduate University
abhijit.gadkari@cgu.edu

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to introduce an information systems security (ISS) policy framework for higher education
institutions. Discussion on security and academic freedom of expression highlights the challenges involved in design and
implementation of a policy model in this environment. Issues of shared governance are explained. These issues demonstrate
the need for the Academic Security Visibility Model (ASVM). The ASVM builds on the existing KMPG Security
Capabilities Model and other research. Different security scenarios will be explained on the basis of the ASVM. This paper
presents a matrix methodology to evaluate infrastructure, resources and activities in the higher-ed environment
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INTRODUCTION

In higher education institutions, the goal for information systems managers is to provide students, professors, faculty and
staff of an institution the ability to freely “share data and collaborate on projects” (Walton, 2002). Inherent to this goal is the
idea that the technology used should not interfere with the user’s activities. On the other hand, attempting to achieve this
goal without proper planning or policy in place may lead to insecurity. Even with proper planning, this goal may be difficult
to achieve. Within most academic institutions, the goal is (or should be) to be as secure as possible without limiting
“academic freedom” (Roiter, 2001).
It is a challenge to develop security policy at all organizational levels in the academic environment given the diverse needs of
students, faculty and staff. While there are corporate models for security, there are few clear models that help the academic
organization understand its own needs. What works for a Fortune 100 company may not work for a small liberal arts college,
although some of the needs will be similar. Academic institutions often function under the notion of “shared governance”
which is in direct contradiction to the top-down, hierarchical approach of many corporations. The academic environment is
subject to many unique pressures.
There is also a disjoint, or “gap” between policy and practice. We recognize this need for practical policy, as well as the need
for high-level models. To address this problem, we propose the integration of some common security models, those being
the KPMG Security Capabilities model and the Security Development System Lifecycle model (SecSDLC). We also
propose our own model to help clarify the problem domain, called the Academic Security Visibility Model or ASVM. The
ASVM attempts to show the interests of the stakeholders through equal representation, as opposed to a top-down approach.
BACKGROUND MATERIAL
Shared Governance & Academic Freedom

Shared governance is traditionally defined as the involvement of faculty in institutional policy-making (Gerber, 2001). This
definition has been slightly updated to include students as well, with students playing a role in organizational decisionmaking. Essentially, shared governance means equal rights when it comes to how the organization formulates a policy.
Academic freedom, as defined in the Columbia Encyclopedia, is the “right of scholars to pursue research, to teach, and to
publish without control or restraint from the institutions that employ them” (Columbia Encyclopedia, 2001). Academic
freedom is a necessity for colleges and universities (Gerber, 2001). It has even been proposed that academic freedom is
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beyond the scope of the United States Constitution, which protects the freedom of individuals to a high degree (Gerber,
2001).
In general, “a conflict exists between the rights of students and faculty to free speech and privacy, and the obligation of
universities, parents, and society to restrict access to information deemed unsuitable for youth” (Peace, 2003). Faculty need
the “affirmative authority to shape the environment in which they carry out the responsibilities”, within reason (Gerber,
2001). Faculty must be entitled to freedom in classroom discussions, research and publication of results, and artistic
expression (Educause/Internet2 workshop, 2003). In addition, faculty & students should be allowed to “seek, receive and
impart information, express themselves freely, and access material regardless of origin, background, or views of those
contribution to their creation” (Educause/Internet2 workshop, 2003). Within academic environments, there is much tolerance
and experimentation, and anonymity is highly valued (Bruhn & Petersen, 2003).
These requirements of academic freedom are “inextricably linked” (Gerber, 2001) with shared governance. Gerber argues
that “shared governance is taking on new importance as a means of trying to preserve the ideals of liberal education that are
necessary for the continued vitality of our democratic society” (Gerber, 2001). Clearly, the political model of shared
governance is the means by which faculty/students of academic institutions should be able to make their needs visible and
preserve their academic freedom.
The KPMG Security Capabilities Model

In 2002, KPMG performed a “Global Information System Security Survey” in which they interviewed 641 senior managers
of global business firms by telephone (KPMG website 2002). One of the results of that survey was the KPMG Security
Capabilities Model (KPMG website 2002). There is some evidence that academic institutions are aware of this model and
are interested in its applications in enterprise-wide information security policies/systems (Walton, 2002). Although originally
designed around the business firm, because academicians have shown their interest in this model, it seems important to
validate this as a piece of the information systems security and policy puzzle.

Figure 1. Enterprise Security Capabilities Model (KPMG, 2002)

The model clearly breaks each level into one or two problem areas, which are handled by organizational stakeholders in that
level’s domain (i.e. the strategic level handles both the leadership and over-arching structure of ISS). In effect this creates
somewhat of a “checklist”, which roughly maps to the overall structure of the organization. Each “domain” consists of some
security responsibilities, which are stated by title but not defined in any detail (for example, what does network perimeter
security really entail?).
The largest criticism of the KPMG model is that it says nothing directly about the process of developing security policy. In
Planning and Control Systems: A Framework for Analysis (written in 1965), Robert Anthony describes a framework that
“consists of formal planning and control systems, designed to facilitate planning and control processes in human
organizations” (Anthony, 1965). Anthony’s work also indicates that there should be a direct link between the highest levels
of the organization (the strategic levels) with the lowest levels of the organization (Anthony, 1965). We must keep this link
in mind when we develop security policy, because the highest levels of the organization must recognize that their decisions
can significantly impact the work of their subordinates. This link implies that upper management must work directly with the
end user to create effective and unobtrusive security policy.
The KPMG model is a common way for visualizing the whole organization (particularly when this organization is not small),
and it is helpful in the discussion of information systems security policy. Anthony’s model illustrates that there can’t be
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structure in complete absence of process (a common mistake in ISS policy). For a more in-depth look of how the security
policy process might actually be implemented & maintained, we suggest the Security System Development Lifecycle model,
or SecSDLC.
The SecSDLC methodology is introduced in the recently published book Principles of Information Security (Whitman &
Mattord, 2003). The SecSDLC model is based on the standard Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) model for
software development (planning, analysis, design and implementation). The main advantage of the SecSDLC is that it is
process-based model with specific steps that can be followed to develop ISS policy.
THE ACADEMIC SECURITY VISIBILITY MODEL (ASVM)

Figure 2. Academic Security Visibility Model

Because of the lack of comprehensive and accessible models for information security policy within the academic
environment, we propose the Academic Security Visibility Model, or ASVM. The ASVM can be used effectively in any
academic environment irrespective of its size, shape and scope. It is customized for the needs of the academic institution, and
can be used in combination with existing frameworks to clarify the security problem domain.
The external entity is everything that is completely outside of the academic institution’s control, i.e. the world. The internal
entity is everything within direct control of the academic institution. This distinction could be more difficult to make than it
seems, because often it is difficult to tell where one organization stops and another begins. However, that is less of a problem
because the goal is effective security policy, and effective security policy must specify some degree of separation between
what’s inside and what’s outside the academic institution’s control.
Within the internal entity of the ASVM are three major categories or “buckets” of interests, which overlap each other to
create a total of seven unique categories requiring different security policies. The three major categories could be referred to
as “needs”, “users”, or “stakeholders” within any given academic institution.
These three major categories are labeled as “academic computing”, “administrative computing” and “residential computing”.
Academic computing represents the needs of students and faculty who wish to use the computer and the network as a
learning tool. The stakeholders may require a high degree of freedom and may not wish to be inhibited by security policy.
Administrative computing includes all administrative functions that the academic institution needs to undertake, such as
working with student enrollment, maintaining student/faculty/staff financial data, grades, etc. This category would require a
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high degree of security because of issues regarding data privacy/protection, and does not necessarily need a high degree of
freedom.
Finally, residential computing is an area which is not a part of every academic organization (which is why it is denoted with a
dashed line). Residential computing includes both on and off campus use of computing resources by students, faculty and
staff, but is specifically such usage which is done from the home. In the case of on-campus students, for example, such
residential computing may be from their dormitory. In the case of off-campus students/faculty/staff, such residential
computing may include accessing internal school resources from the comfort of their homes or from outside the organization.
It is key to notice the interactions and relationships that occur by overlapping the groups (denoted as w, x, y and z in the
diagram). This is a critical aspect of the ASVM model, because it must be assumed that within the organization there are
many diverse needs, and some of these needs are not met by the three broad categories of academic, administrative, or
residential computing. For example, there may be students who wish to perform academic tasks from their dormitory. This
is academic computing, but it is being performed through the residential computing resource. This case is labeled “x” in the
ASVM diagram.
One can easily extrapolate what the other letters define, with the exception of the letter z. The label “y” might be a student in
a dormitory who wishes to access the administrative computing resource to register for a course. The label “w” might be a
professor who needs to report the grades received in an academic project to the administrative computing resource. As
already mentioned, the label “x” might be a student doing academic research from their dormitory. The inclusion of these
interactions propels these needs to the forefront, making them visible.
The label “z” might be confusing; it essentially represents the interactions of all of the internal groups/needs – an essential
“common ground”. It may be that the label “z” represents a fourth category e.g. the academic institution’s Intranet. Also, the
academic institution’s public computing facilities are depicted in the area surrounding the internal groups. These public
computing resources might be public workstations that any of the three other categories (administrative, academic &
residential) may have access to. These public resources still require security policy but need a lower level of security than the
major computing resources.
There are also public institutional facilities, which are another vital component of the model. This region, which surrounds
the three inner categories, can be treated as a DMZ1. This region is a good location for a proxy server. The proxy server can
be used for regulating the traffic that travels from one network to other or from outside the network into inside the network.
This region is also where wireless network capabilities would be found. Infrastructure is an important component of any
policy matter. The infrastructure management matrix shown in Table 1 explains the relationships between different
components associated with infrastructure issues in the academic environment.

Table 1

The ASVM can be effectively used to understand the complex problem depicted in Table 1, and its long term as well as
short-term impacts on the academic environment.

Table 2

The resource management matrix (Table 2) will provide visibility and will help in formation as well as implementation of
security policy for shared resources. Once the appropriate resource management policy is drafted, the next task should be to
think about possible activity domains. The activity management matrix (Table 3) will explain the related issues in more
detail.
1

DMZ : demilitarized zone
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Table 3

The activity management matrix (Table 4), explains a policy based-concept to handle the security and identity related issues
in an academic computing environment.

Table 4
CONCLUSIONS

The ASVM model can be viewed in many different ways, and has many implications for information security policy within
an academic environment. This model presents a very broad network diagram, a map of custom needs and stakeholder
groups, a guide for firewall configuration, a starting point for vulnerability analysis, and much more. The power of this
model is its flexibility, which revolves around the notion of visibility. The security policy must be sensitive to issues all the
way from individual user needs within the organization, to what is actually going on inside the academic network. In other
words, these issues must be visible to the management to be addressed by a comprehensive security policy.
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